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ABSTRACT   
This paper explores the cost structure of Swiss hospitals, focusing on differences due 
to teaching activities and those across different ownership and subsidization types. A 
stochastic total cost frontier with a Cobb-Douglas functional form has been estimated 
for a panel of 150 general hospitals over the six-year period from 1998 and 2003. 
Inpatient cases adjusted by DRG cost weights and ambulatory revenues are 
considered as two separate outputs. The adopted econometric specification allows for 
unobserved heterogeneity across hospitals. The results indicate that the time-invariant 
unobserved factors could account for considerable cost differences that could be only 
partly due to inefficiency. The results suggest that teaching activities are an important 
cost driving factor and hospitals that have a broader range of specialization are 
relatively more costly. The excess costs of university hospitals can be explained by 
more extensive teaching activities as well as the relatively high quality of medical 
units. However, even after controlling for such differences university hospitals have 
shown a relatively low cost-efficiency especially in the first two or three years of the 
sample period. The analysis does not provide any evidence of significant efficiency 
differences across ownership and subsidization categories.  
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1. Introduction 
The increasing growth of health care costs in Switzerland has raised the public 
interest in identifying the possibilities of improvement in productive efficiency. 
General hospitals (specialized clinics excluded) that account for about a quarter of 
national health expenditures have been subject of much debate and a few studies. The 
previous empirical studies [1,2] have found significant differences in productivity 
and/or cost-efficiency among hospitals. Identifying the sources of such differences is 
an important policy issue that has not been explored sufficiently in the Swiss context.  
Ownership and subsidization as well as research and teaching activities have 
been considered as important cost-driving factors among Swiss hospitals. University 
hospitals have been often criticized for being excessively costly. Many policy-makers 
believe that public and subsidized hospitals are not as efficient as private facilities. 
However these policy debates remain qualitative and lack sufficient empirical 
evidence.  
The present study addresses the above issues using data form a national 
sample of 150 general hospitals over a 6-year period from 1998 to 2003. Compared to 
the previous research on Swiss hospitals this paper benefits from a larger data set and 
several additional variables especially those related to teaching activities. Moreover, 
the adopted methodology is based on some of the recent developments in stochastic 
frontier panel data models. A total cost frontier with the Cobb-Douglas functional 
form has been estimated.  
The analysis indicates that teaching activities can explain part of cost 
differences among hospitals. The results suggest that university hospitals while 
showing the highest average inefficiency scores, have improved over the sample 
period. There is no evidence of statistically significant efficiency differences among 
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hospitals with different ownership/subsidy types. The estimation results also point to 
unexploited economies of scale in a majority of the studied hospitals.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general 
description of the adopted methodology with discussions of the functional form and 
econometric models. Section 3 describes the model specification. The data and 
descriptive statistics are given in Section 4. The estimation results along with a are 
presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Methodology  
Though many authors [3-5] have used cost frontier models to evaluate 
hospitals’ efficiency, the application of such models in the health-care sector has been 
criticized [6,7]. The main arguments against these models are related to the 
unobserved heterogeneity due to differences in case-mix and quality of care as well as 
the errors incurred by aggregation of outputs. Admitting the sensitivity of individual 
efficiency estimates other studies show the practical use of stochastic frontier analysis 
for comparing the performance across groups of providers [8-10]. Following this 
thread of literature, we adopt a stochastic cost frontier approach to estimate the 
efficiency differences across hospital types. A complementary analysis with GLS 
estimation has been used to confirm the results. In this section, the adopted functional 
form and the econometric specification are discussed.   
 
Functional form 
Griffin et al. [12] provide a comprehensive list of alternative functional forms 
and proposed a series of criteria for model selection in cost and production analyses. 
In this study the most important restrictions are related to the sample size and the 
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estimation method. As the number of variables increase, most functional forms 
require a geometrically increasing number of parameters to be estimated, thus 
necessitate much larger samples. The best choice is therefore a functional form that 
can be estimated with available estimation procedures and limits the number of 
parameters while using as many relevant variables as possible. One of the most 
commonly used functional forms is the Cobb-Douglas (log-linear) model. Using this 
form the cost function with M outputs, N input factors and K output characteristics 
can be written as: 
  0
1 1 1
l n ln ln
M N K
m m n n k k
m n k
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= = =
= + + +∑ ∑ ∑   (1) 
where TC is the total costs; Ym (m=1, … , M) are the outputs; Pn (n=1, …, N) are the 
input factor prices; and Zk (k=1, ... , K) are output characteristics and other exogenous 
factors that may affect costs.  
Thanks to its limited number of variables the Cobb-Douglas form has a 
practical advantage in regards to estimation and interpretation, over more complicated 
forms. Because of its simplicity, this functional form is commonly used in recent 
papers on cost-efficiency measurements [1,4,13,14]. The main shortcoming of this 
model is the assumption of constant scale elasticity, which implies a constant rate of 
scale economies. This is considered as restrictive because by using the same 
proportional increase in output, small companies usually gain more than large firms. 
On the other hand, in many cases, the scale elasticity could be more or less constant in 
the range of observed data.    
 The potential changes in scale elasticity with output can be analyzed using 
flexible functional forms such as translog. However, a translog model requires the 
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estimation of a large number of parameters. As we will see later there are at least 15 
important variables that are essential for our cost models and the number of 
parameters in more general functional forms can be excessively high compared to our 
limited sample size. Furthermore, the included interaction terms could cause 
multicollinearity, which can affect the model’s statistical performance. Our 
preliminary analyses showed that a numerically feasible estimation of a translog cost 
frontier with non-degenerate stochastic components was only possible with simplified 
specifications that excluded some of the important output characteristics. We 
therefore decided to focus on the Cobb-Douglas functional form. Nevertheless our 
main results especially those related to scale economies are also confirmed by an 
additional analysis with a parsimonious translog model with homothetic cost function.  
 Resulting from a minimization problem given input prices and output, cost 
functions must be non-decreasing, concave, linearly homogeneous in input prices and 
non-decreasing in output [15]. The linear homogeneity constraint is usually imposed 
by dividing total costs and input prices by one of the factor prices. However, as we 
see later, we do not impose this restriction because our models do not include all input 
factors. Other theoretical restrictions are usually verified after the estimation. In 
particular, the concavity of the estimated cost function reflects the fact that the cost 
function is a result of cost minimization.  
 Cost frontier models also allow an estimation of scale efficiency. Scale 
efficiency indicates the degree to which a company is producing at optimal scale, 
namely, the output level that minimizes the average cost. The optimal scale is defined 
as the level of operation where the scale elasticity is equal to one [16]. The degree of 
returns to scale (RS) is defined as the proportional increase in output (Y) resulting 
from a proportional increase in all input factors, holding all input prices and output 
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characteristic variables fixed [17]. The RS degree may also be defined in terms of the 
effects on total costs resulting from a proportional increase in output [18]. This is 
equivalent to the inverse of the elasticity of total cost with respect to the output, which 
can be obtained from: l n1
ln
T CR S
Y
∂⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠ . TC and Y represent the hospital’s 
total cost and output respectively. The firm operates at increasing returns to scale if 
RS is greater than 1, indicating unexploited scale economies, in which case the 
average costs can be reduced by increasing the output. The company’s optimal size 
(output) can be obtained when scale economies are fully exploited that is, RS = 1. 
 
Econometric models 
There are a number of econometric approaches to estimate stochastic cost 
frontier models [19]. The original cost frontier model [20] applied to panel data can be 
written as:  
  1 1 1l n ( , . . . , ; , . . . , ; , . . . , )i t i t M i t i t N i t i t K i t i t i tT C f Y Y P P Z Z u v= + +  (2) 
where subscripts i and t represent the firm and year respectively; uit is a positive 
stochastic term representing inefficiency of firm i in year t;  vit  is the random noise or 
unobserved heterogeneity; and other variables are similar to those in Equation (1). 
Typically, it is assumed that the heterogeneity term vit is normally distributed and that 
the inefficiency term uit has a half-normal distribution that is, a normal distribution 
truncated at zero:  
  2 2 ~ (0, ) , ~ (0, ).it u it vu N v Nσ σ       (3) 
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The firm’s inefficiency is estimated using the conditional mean of the inefficiency 
term as proposed by Jondrow et al. [21] that is: ˆE it itu ε⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , where it it itu vε = + .  
Assuming a time-invariant inefficiency term uit=ui, this term can be identified 
by panels’ individual fixed or random effects [22,23]. The resulting specifications 
relax the distribution assumptions on stochastic terms, in particular in the fixed effect 
specification the individual firm effects (ui) do not need to be uncorrelated with 
explanatory variables. Several authors have extended the above panel data models to 
include time-variant inefficiency [24-26]. Others [13,27-31] have adopted another 
approach in which a stochastic firm-specific term (fixed or random effect) is added 
into the original stochastic frontier model presented in Equation (2). This approach 
allows a distinction of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across firms from the 
time-variant differences that are interpreted as inefficiency. Such a distinction is 
particularly important in hospital cost functions which are characterized by strong 
unobserved heterogeneity associated with case mix and quality differences, many of 
which are hospital-specific and would not change considerably over time. Failure to 
account for such differences could result in overstating inefficiencies.    
In particular the random intercept frontier model (‘true’ random effects 
frontier model) proposed by Greene [13,31] has been successfully used in other sectors 
like nursing homes [10] and public transport [11]. This model can be written by adding 
an firm-specific stochastic term 2i (0, )N αα σ∼ , on the right-hand-side of Equation (2). 
As opposed to alternatives with fixed effects, this model does not have the incidental 
parameters problem. The main difficulty of this model is in its numerically 
cumbersome estimation method. As the likelihood function does not have a closed 
from, this model is estimated using Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) 
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estimation method, in which the random effects ( iα ) are simulated by random draws. 
Because of non-linearity of errors in the number of simulations, the SML estimators 
require a large number of simulations or might show sensitivity to the draws [32].  
In this paper, we use the Greene’s true random effect frontier model that we 
label as TRE. We use pseudo-random Halton draws to minimize the potential 
sensitivity of the results to simulation process. Number of draws has been fixed to 
1000. Our sensitivity analysis using several options suggested that the estimations are 
not sensitive when the number of draws is higher than a few hundred. The 
inefficiency is estimated using the (simulated) conditional mean of the inefficiency 
term (uit) given by ˆE it itu ω⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , where it i it itu vω α= + +  [33]. In addition to the true 
random effects (TRE) model, we estimated the original pooled frontier model as 
shown in Equation (2). The inefficiency estimates obtained from these two models 
complement each other. Namely, TRE estimates are expected to be at the lower bound 
of inefficiencies as unlike the pooled model’s estimates, they are abstracted from 
potential persistent inefficiencies that remain more or less constant over time.  
 
Differences across ownership/subsidization types 
Although, economic theory predicts lower costs for organizations with 
relatively high-powered financial incentives such as for-profit and non-subsidized 
firms, the empirical literature does not provide a strong evidence of such differences 
in hospitals. While many authors [2,34] conclude no significant differences, a few 
studies [35,36] report evidence of slightly lower costs in for-profit hospitals compared 
to non-profit ones. In this paper, the effects of ownership/subsidization status on 
efficiency are studied using a two-stage method. This method is based on testing the 
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significance of efficiency differences across hospital groups. We use the Kruskal-
Wallis (KW) rank test [37] as well as the t-test with unequal variances. The KW test is 
a non-parametric test that has been often used in frontier analysis [38,39]. The two-
stage approach has a disadvantage in that the first-stage estimation errors may affect 
the results of the test in the second-stage. These errors may lead to an under-rejection 
of the null hypothesis postulating similar cost-efficiencies across different categories 
[39]. On the other hand, the two-stage approach allows the use of non-parametric 
statistical tests that do not impose any distribution assumption on the efficiency 
scores. The KW test has an additional advantage in that it relies on efficiency ranks 
rather than efficiency magnitudes that are subject to relatively large estimation errors 
and sensitive to outlier values. 
An alternative approach is to include type indicators in the regressions and test 
the significance of the corresponding coefficients. We performed a GLS estimation of 
this alternative specification to confirm the KW results. Given that the hospital types 
are more or less constant over the sample period, the tests could also be performed on 
the hospital average values over the sample period. Our data show that the 
subsidization status has not changed over the sample period and out of the 150 
hospitals in the sample there are only 9 hospitals whose ownership status has changed 
from one year to another. However, our analysis shows that the results of the tests 
would not change significantly, should the tests be performed on hospital average 
values over the sample period. 
 
3. Model specification 
The specification used in this study is based on two main outputs: 
hospitalizations and outpatient (ambulatory) care. In line with many other papers in 
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the literature [4,5,40] the main measure of hospitalization output is taken as a DRG 
weighted number of hospitalizations. We prefer this approach over the alternative in 
which the hospitalizations are classified into a few output categories based on their 
DRG weights [41], mainly because such categories might be arbitrary as the DRG 
weights define the cost intensity of the cases rather than different service categories.  
Since the number of outpatient cases is not available in the data, the 
ambulatory output is approximated by the corresponding revenues adjusted for 
inflation. This approximation is based on the assumption that the average unit price of 
ambulatory care is similar across hospitals. The reported zero values for ambulatory 
revenues (2 hospitals) have been substituted by the nominal value of 1 Franc. Given 
the negligible number of the zero values, we preferred this approach [42,43] over more 
elaborate solutions such as Box-Cox or hybrid functional forms [44]. Three input 
factors are considered: capital, physicians’ input and all other employees’ labor. 
Similar to several other studies [5,45-46], capital prices are approximated by the 
hospital’s total capital expenditure divided by the number of available beds in the 
hospital.  
In line with many authors [2,8,34,47,48] who have considered labor inputs in 
two or more categories, physicians and non-physicians are considered as two separate 
labor inputs. In fact physicians’ services constitute of interventions for medical 
treatments while other employees’ services are more continuous and aimed at nursing 
care, administration and maintenance. Furthermore, wages are considerably higher 
and more variable among physicians than other employees. Labor prices are 
calculated by dividing total salaries by the number of remunerated days. Only 
employed physicians are considered. The physicians’ fees accounting on average for 
about 5% of the hospital’s total costs, might also include payments to physicians who 
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are not employed by the hospital, thus are not included. Both labor prices are 
proportionally adjusted for social benefits, accounting on average, for about 9% of 
total costs. These charges are proportionally distributed to each one of the two groups 
(physicians, non-physicians), the proportions being the respective shares of each 
group’s salaries. This adjustment captures the potential variation in social benefits 
across hospitals due to differences in pension funds as well as the age and seniority of 
the employees mix. 
The three input factor prices considered in the model correspond to about 70 
percent of a hospital’s total cost on average. The available data do not allow an 
appropriate calculation of the prices of remaining inputs such as medical materials, 
food, cleaning, water and power as well as physicians’ fees and other personnel 
charges. Given that the model specification does not include all input prices, the linear 
homogeneity cannot be imposed. The excluded prices are obviously not constant and 
neglecting their variation could affect the estimation results. However, some of these 
variations are probably captured by the three included factor prices. For instance, 
physicians’ fees are likely to be correlated with physicians’ salaries. Another concern 
is the accuracy of the price data that may create bias in the price coefficients. 
However, other coefficients are not affected if these measurement errors and the 
unobserved factor prices are uncorrelated with explanatory variables.  
Similar to previous studies [36,47,48] the average length of hospitalization has 
been included in the model. In addition to representing hospital’s ‘hotel services’ like 
nursing care and accommodation [49], this variable provides an additional measure of 
severity of the case mix. It should be noted that the DRG adjustment is only an 
approximate way to control for severity variations. In fact, there are considerable 
variations among patients within a DRG, as indicated by the wide range of acceptable 
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hospital stays provided by the Swiss AP-DRG [50]. Other characteristics in the model 
include the number of medical service centers, and the number of medicotechnical, 
therapeutic and infrastructure units. These variables represent the range of 
specializations offered in the hospital. The share of outpatient clinics (over all medical 
service centers) operated by the hospital is also included as a complementary measure 
of ambulatory output in the model. The level of hospital’s teaching activities is 
measured by the total number of postgraduate medical training positions offered in the 
hospital and the share of the positions that are recognized by the Swiss Medical 
Association (FMH) in specialized categories. Moreover, the model includes the 
percentage of medical service centers that are accredited by FMH for specialized 
medical training.  
Hospitals’ costs can also be affected by quality of care. The evidence on the 
effect of quality measures on hospital costs is rather mixed. Some studies conclude 
that quality indicators do not have significant cost effects [3,5,51], whereas others 
suggest a significant effect for structural quality measures such as bed availability and 
the share of board-certified physicians [8]. This may be explained by the fact that the 
structural quality is usually easier to measure whereas other quality indicators 
especially outcome measures are prone to measurement errors and outside factors. In 
this paper we focus on structural measures of quality. In addition to the share of 
FMH-recognized medical units and training positions, we included the hospital’s 
nurse per bed ratio to represent the quality of nursing care.  
We also included two binary indicators for emergency room (ER) and 
geriatrics department. While emergency services are usually involved with relatively 
severe cases, geriatrics cases are less intensive in medical care thus less costly. Year 
dummies are included to capture the overall technological progress and the variation 
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in unobserved variables such as potential differences in reporting procedures and data 
collection from one year to another. 
The specification of the true random effects model can therefore be written as:  
     
0 1 2 1 2 1 3 2
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 1 2
    99 00 01 02 03
ln ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln ln
99 00 01 02 03
it it it it it it
it it it it it
it it it it it
t t t t t i it it
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  (4) 
Subscripts i and t represent the hospital and year respectively. The stochastic 
components αi, uit and vit respectively represent the hospital-specific random effect, 
inefficiency term and random noise: 2 2 2i (0, ), (0, ) and (0, )it v it uN v N u Nαα σ σ σ+∼ ∼ ∼ , 
as described in the previous section. Y is the DRG-adjusted number of 
hospitalizations; AMB the ambulatory revenue; PK, PL1 and PL2 are respective factor 
prices for capital, physicians and other employees; LOS is the average length of 
hospitalization; NB is the nurse per bed ratio; MU the number of medical units; TU 
the number of techno-medical, therapeutic and infrastructure units; NP the number of 
medical training positions; AMBC is the fraction of ambulatory clinics over all 
medical units; FMH is the fraction of medical units recognized by FMH; AB is the 
fraction of medical training positions recognized by FMH in the two highest 
categories; and ER and GER are dummy variables for emergency room and geriatrics 
department respectively. Finally, Y99 through Y03 are year dummies for 1999 through 
2003, with 1998 being the omitted year. The pooled model is a special case of 
Equation (4), in which the stochastic component αi is set equal to zero. 
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4. Data 
The data used in this paper are extracted from the annual financial and 
administrative data reported by general hospitals to the Federal Statistical Office [52] 
from 1998 to 2003. These data have been merged with another data set consisting of 
an aggregate extraction of the medical data of the Swiss hospitals with records for 
individual hospitalizations [53]. The extracted medical data consist of the number of 
cases by AP-DRG in each hospital-year, including about a million observations. 
Using the cost weights from Swiss AP-DRG version 4.0 [50], we calculated an 
average cost weight (AP-DRG adjustment ratio) for each hospital-year. The adjusted 
number of admissions is then calculated by multiplying these average cost weights by 
the number of admissions recorded in the administrative data. 
After excluding the observations with missing and invalid values from an 
unbalanced panel with 1082 observations from 221 general hospitals, the final sample 
was created with 632 observations from 150 hospitals operating from 1998 through 
2003. The excluded observations are mainly those with missing DRG data or 
erroneous values for outpatient revenues. We also excluded three hospitals with fewer 
than 20 beds. In general, the excluded observations with missing or suspicious values 
include higher proportion of small-size hospitals. Statistical tests (t-test) suggest that 
the excluded observations are from hospitals with significantly lower number of beds 
(an average of 110 beds against 211 beds for the hospitals included in the sample). 
However, similar tests suggest that there is no significant difference regarding average 
cost of a hospitalization across the two groups. Therefore, we assert that the resulting 
sample remains more or less representative of the Swiss general hospital sector. The 
sample also includes all the five university hospitals in Switzerland.  
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A descriptive summary of the variables used in the analysis is given in Table 
1. As this table shows there is a considerable variation among hospitals in most 
variables. While hospital capacity varies from 20 to about 1200 beds, the average cost 
of a hospitalization varies from 4,500 to 54,000 Francs. The average length of 
hospitalization also varies considerably across hospitals ranging from 4 to about 50 
days.  
The number of general hospitals in the sample and their average capacity by 
ownership/subsidy types are listed in Table 2. All public hospitals and most private 
non-profit hospitals are subsidized, whereas in the private for-profit sector, a large 
fraction of hospitals are not. Table 2 also lists the average hospital size measured by 
the number of beds for each ownership/subsidy type. Public hospitals with an average 
of 258 beds are by far the largest providers of health care in the sample. Subsidized 
hospitals are also considerably larger than non-subsidized ones.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
Hospital's total costs 
(CHF '000) 85'720 138'909 5'036 884'764
Number of hospitalizations 7'467 7'784 367 50'774
Number of hospitalizations
(AP-DRG adjusted) 6'486 7'791 208 49'251
Average total cost per 
hospitalization (CHF '000) 10.15 4.51 4.39 53.78
Average AP-DRG
cost weight 0.8213 0.1124 0.5204 1.4735
Number of patient-days 62'682 62'975 4'997 410'140
Average length of hospitalizations 
(days) 10.1 5.2 3.9 49.1
Average length of full 
hospitalizations (days) a
11.1 5.1 4.5 49.1
Hospiatl's outpatient revenues  
(CHF '000) 12'759 21'725 0 144'802
Hospital capacity 
(number of beds) 211.5 219.1 20 1277
P K (capital price) 
CHF '000 per bed      
24.75 23.58 3.08 242.57
P L  - physicians
b
(CHF per day) 
345.93 134.59 93.22 1'044.49
P L  - other employees
c
(CHF per day)       
177.42 32.86 76.82 320.02
Nurse per bed ratio 1.357 0.505 0.474 4.410
Number of hospital's medical 
service centers 31.6 16.9 4 81
Number of hospital's
non-medical units d
31.7 7.3 9 48
Number of postgraduate medical 
training position 45.0 94.9 1 583
Fraction of ambulatory clinics in 
medical units 0.1204 0.0825 0 0.4286
Fraction of medical units 
recognized by FMH 0.2338 0.1910 0 0.8571
Fraction of accredited training 
positions (FMH types A and B) 0.6050 0.3579 0 1
Max.Min.Mean Std. Dev.
 
 
- The sample includes 632 observations from 150 general hospitals (1998-2003).  
- All monetary values are adjusted by the global consumer price index relative to 2003 prices. 
- Semi-hospitalizations (shorter than 24 hours) are considered as one-day hospitalizations. 
a Excludes semi-hospitalizations (over-night hospital stays shorter than 24 hours). 
b Employed physicians' average salary, adjusted for social benefits and excludes fees. 
c Average salary (adjusted for social benefits) of all hospital employees except physicians. 
d Includes medicotechnical, therapeutic and infrastructure units. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (continued) 
Emergency Room 0.9177 0.2750 0 1
Geriatrics 0.5285 0.4996 0 1
Year 1998 0.1108 0.3141 0 1
Year 1999 0.1566 0.3638 0 1
Year 2000 0.1851 0.3887 0 1
Year 2001 0.1867 0.3900 0 1
Year 2002 0.1883 0.3913 0 1
Year 2003 0.1725 0.3781 0 1
Private for-profit Hospital 0.0965 0.2955 0 1
Private non-profit hospital 0.3307 0.4708 0 1
Public hospital 0.5728 0.4951 0 1
Subsidized hospital 0.9098 0.2867 0 1
University hospital 0.0380 0.1913 0 1
Max.Min.Mean Std. Dev.
 
 
   - The sample includes 632 observations from 150 general hospitals (1998-2003). 
 
 
Table 2: Number of hospitals and average size by ownership/subsidy (1998-2003) 
PUBLIC PRIVATE NON-PROFIT
PRIVATE 
FOR-PROFIT TOTAL
Hospitals 362 175 38 575
Hospital size (beds) 258 155 194 222
Hospitals 34 23 57
Hospital size (beds) 80 133 101
Hospitals 362 209 61 632
Hospital size (beds) 258 143 171 211
TOTAL
SUBSIDIZED
NON SUBSIDIZED -
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5. Results  
Table 3 lists the regression results of the cost frontier analysis as presented in 
Equation (4). The estimated coefficients generally have the expected signs and mostly 
statistically significant. Overall, the differences across the two models, while being 
statistically significant, are not much considerable for practical purposes. According 
to the TRE model the main output’s coefficient is 0.64, that is, 1% increase in the 
adjusted number of hospitalization will result in about 0.64% increase in total costs. 
As expected, the coefficient of ambulatory output is much smaller (.10), suggesting a 
0.1% rise in total costs as a result of 1% increase in outpatient revenues, ceteris 
paribus. The estimated coefficient of LOS (.4) suggests that this variable is an 
important predictor of hospital costs. For instance, a 1% increase in the average length 
of hospitalization results in a 0.4% increase in total costs. Given that hospital stays are 
on average about 10 days, this implies that a difference of one day in the hospital’s 
average LOS is approximately equivalent to 4% of total costs. In the pooled model, 
LOS shows a greater effect (.53). This could suggest that this variable may also 
capture some of the unobserved severity differences among hospitals.  
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Table 3:  Estimation results 
0.7447 * 0.6373 *
(0.016) (0.0049)
0.5293 * 0.3968 *
(0.021) (0.0062)
0.0652 * 0.0998 *
(0.0067) (0.0018)
0.1452 * 0.1174 *
(0.010) (0.0031)
0.1022 * 0.0335 *
(0.019) (0.0059)
0.2471 * 0.1537
(0.045) (0.013)
0.2730 * 0.1405 *
(0.028) (0.0083)
0.0746 * 0.0797 *
(0.016) (0.0048)
-0.0141 0.0878 *
(0.040) (0.012)
0.1109 * 0.0921 *
(0.012) (0.0034)
-0.2685 * -0.3520 *
(0.076) (0.023)
0.0433 0.0695 *
(0.040) (0.012)
0.0483 0.0147
(0.026) (0.0078)
-0.0277 0.0467 *
(0.024) (0.0076)
-0.0375 * -0.0263 *
(0.014) (0.0041)
-0.0166 -0.0065
(0.022) (0.0070)
0.0175 0.0182 *
(0.022) (0.0065)
0.0335 0.0459 *
(0.022) (0.0065)
0.0485 * 0.0658 *
(0.022) (0.0064)
0.0560 * 0.0710 *
(0.022) (0.0066)
-0.1378 1.4234 *
(0.27) (0.078)
0.1703 *
(0.0023)
0.1902 * 0.0890 *
(0.00024) (0.0018)
1.4544 * 1.7992 *
(0.13) (0.10)
Log Likelihood 336.08 598.03
 -
Pooled Model True RE Model
Average length of all 
hospitalizations
Outpatient revenues
P K (capital price)     
P L  - physicians     
P L  - others         
Nurse per bed
Number of hospitalizations 
(AP-DRG adjusted)
Year 2002
Year 2003
Constant (α )
Number of 
medical units
Number of 
non-medical units
Number of 
training positions
Fraction of 
ambulatory clinics
λ =σ u /σ v
Fraction of training 
positions A and B
Fraction of medical units 
recognized by FMH
Emergency Room
Geriatrics
Year 1999
Year 2000
σ
[where: σ 2 =σ u 2 +σ v 2 ]
σ α
Year 2001
 
 
* Significant at 5%; Standard errors are given in parentheses; Dependent variable is hospital's 
total costs in logs; All variables except dummies and the three fractions are in logarithms. 
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As expected, the price coefficients are positive and significant. However, these 
estimates significantly differ from the average actual share of the corresponding input 
factors (about 7, 11 and 53 percent for capital, physician services and other 
employees). This result can be related to the fact that because of labor contracts and 
other institutional restrictions hospitals are not fully responsive to changes in labor 
prices. As for quasi-fixed factors like capital stock, hospitals cannot change their 
allocations quickly. This might imply that hospitals do not completely minimize their 
total costs. However, as all hospitals face more or less similar constraints, we can 
assume that their cost frontiers follow a similar form. It should also be noted that 
hospitals might have other objectives in addition to cost minimization, in which case 
functions based on cost optimization can still be used as a “behavioral” cost functions 
and can be helpful in studying the firms’ behavior rather than their production 
technological characteristics [49,55].  
As seen in Table 3, the number of hospital units has a significant effect on 
total costs. The numbers suggest that increasing the number of medical centers by 10 
percent would result in only about 0.8% increase in total costs. The marginal cost of 
training positions is also low but statistically significant. The results predict an 
average increase of 0.9% in total costs for 10% increase in the number of positions. 
The share of ambulatory clinics has a negative and significant effect, consistent with 
the fact that ambulatory visits are usually less costly than inpatient care. The TRE 
model suggests that for instance, an increase of 10 percentage points in the share of 
ambulatory clinics thus 10 points decrease in the share of inpatient units, results in a 
decrease of about 3.5% in the hospital’s total costs. The share of specialized training 
positions has a positive effect on hospital’s costs, but this effect is only significant at 
10% level. However, the fraction of medical centers with FMH recognition has a 
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significant effect on total costs. According to TRE model’s estimates, the marginal 
cost of 10 percentage point increase in this fraction is about 0.7% of the hospital’s 
total costs.  
The nurse per bed ratio has a relatively high and significant effect, indicating 
that the cost of nursing care is quite considerable. As expected, the ER dummy has a 
positive coefficient and the geriatrics dummy has a negative effect. The coefficients 
of the year dummies suggest a positive growth in hospital costs starting from 2000, 
with an average annual rate of 1 to 3 percent.  
Regarding scale economies, the results listed in Table 3 indicate a main output 
coefficient of 0.64 to 0.74, suggesting that the returns to scale are on average 
significantly higher than 1 (from 1.3 to 1.6 depending on the model). This suggests 
that the majority of general hospitals in Switzerland do not fully exploit the potential 
scale economies. However, it should be noted that these economies are likely to be 
marginal for large hospitals with more than 130 to 200 beds [47,56-58].  
 
Overall cost-efficiency  
Table 4 provides a descriptive summary of the inefficiency scores estimated 
by the two models. The pooled model’s estimates are (12% inefficiency on average) 
higher than those of the TRE model (6% on average). Taken literally, these results 
suggest that on average, one can reduce the hospital costs by 6 or 12 percent. These 
results are in general lower than the inefficiency estimates reported in previous studies 
for the Swiss hospitals [1,2,59]. However, the differences can be explained by several 
additional characteristics included in this paper, such as teaching and specialization 
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variables, and/or a different methodology in separating random noise from 
inefficiency differences.  
 
Table 4:  Descriptive summary of inefficiency estimates 
Pooled 0.1242 0.0661 0.0323 0.0792 0.1100 0.1513 0.5239
True RE 0.0601 0.0332 0.0149 0.0389 0.0521 0.0723 0.2880
3rd 
Quartile
Max.Model Mean Std. Dev. Min. 1st 
Quartile
Median
 
 
The inefficiency estimates are in general comparable to similar estimates 
reported in the literature for the US hospitals, ranging from 5 to 15 percent [3,8,34], 
but differ from other studies particularly those on European samples, which estimate 
generally higher levels of inefficiency amounting to 20 to 30 percent [4,45,46,59,60]. It 
should be noted that even the seemingly low values estimated from the TRE model 
are equivalent to considerable excess costs amounting, for instance in 2003, to about 
630 million Francs out of the actual total costs of 11 billion Francs for the 150 
hospitals in the sample. The 6 percent average inefficiency is also equivalent to 2 or 3 
years efficiency lag according to the efficiency targets set by the UK health care 
authorities, based on an annual efficiency gain of about 2 to 3 percent [61].  
The inefficiency scores obtained from the two models are significantly 
correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.50. As expected the TRE model that 
accounts for hospital-specific unobserved factors, produces a lower level of 
inefficiency. This suggests that these factors could account on average, for about 6 
percent of the hospital’s total costs. The inefficiency estimates based on the TRE 
model are valid if all the hospital-specific (time-invariant) effects are due to external 
factors beyond the hospital’s control. In this case, the inefficiency is limited to 6% on 
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average. On the other hand, if time-variant differences and hospital-specific effects 
are not separated, as in the pooled model, the average inefficiency amounts to 12%. 
According to this model, a quarter of the studied hospitals show 15% or more excess 
costs. However, the inefficiency is less than 11 percent for half of the sample and the 
excess costs are rarely more than 20 percent. 
The TRE model’s estimates do not include the persistent inefficiencies that 
might stay constant over time. In fact in this model the persistent excess costs are 
assumed to be related to external factors rather than inefficiency. This model assumes 
that, with managers constantly facing new market conditions and technologies, 
inefficiencies vary with time, whereas some of the external factors that are beyond the 
management’s control such as hospital location and case mix remain more or less 
constant. It is difficult to assess the validity of this assumption in the context of Swiss 
hospitals, in which certain inefficiencies may persist because of institutional 
restrictions and strong regulation. Therefore, we cannot favor any model over the 
other. We contend that the two estimates (6% and 12%) could represent reasonable 
lower and upper bounds for the average inefficiency in Swiss hospitals.  
 
Cost-efficiency in university hospitals  
The estimation results suggest that university hospitals are on average less 
efficient than other hospitals. However, this difference is not statistically significant in 
the TRE model. Excepting the university hospitals the average efficiency estimates do 
not show any significant changes over time. University hospitals however show a 
different pattern with a relatively high inefficiency in the first years (1998 to 2000) 
and a decreasing trend over the sample period (Figure 1).  
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Several t-tests on the university hospitals’ efficiency scores across different 
years suggest that the efficiency improvement in university hospitals is statistically 
significant. According to these estimates, from 1998 to 2003, university hospitals 
have considerably reduced their excessive costs. The estimated decrease in 
inefficiency score is 10 percentage points (from 24% to 14%) in the pooled model and 
about 4 points (from 10% to 5.5%) in the TRE model. Part of these changes could be 
explained by the variation of case mix severity. In fact, the trends in AP-DRG cost 
weights suggest that the severity of the patient mix has grown relatively more in 
university hospitals (Figure 2). Over the sample period the average cost weight for 
university hospitals has increased from 0.99 to 1.17 whereas the corresponding 
change in other hospitals is from 0.78 to 0.84. Given that in Switzerland, DRG coding 
has been introduced in 1998, some of such increases might be related to changes in 
the quality of DRG coding especially in university hospitals that, having relatively 
severe cases, require a more elaborate coding practice. In this case the observed 
changes in efficiency of university hospitals could be an artifact of a different DRG 
coding.   
In order to explore the relationship between changes in severity and 
inefficiency, we estimated another model similar to Equation (4), with the only 
difference that the number of admissions is not adjusted for AP-DRG cost weights. 
The inefficiency estimates of this analysis still show a slight but significant 
improvement (about 2 or 3 percentage points) in university hospitals over the sample 
period. These results indicate that part of efficiency gains in university hospitals could 
be related to the fact that these hospitals increasingly treat more severe cases. 
However, even if we assume that the observed severity trends are entirely related to 
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gradual effect of better coding practices, the results still indicate that on average 
university hospitals have improved.  
 
Figure 1: Efficiency trend in university hospitals 
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Figure 2: Average AP-DRG cost weight  
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Effects of ownership/subsidy types  
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The average inefficiency estimates are listed by ownership and subsidization 
categories in Table 5 and Table 6 respectively for the pooled and TRE models. These 
results point to some differences among various hospital types. The main observed 
difference is between subsidized and non-subsidized hospitals, suggesting a higher 
level of efficiency for the former group. We explored the significance of these 
differences with several Kruskal-Wallis and t-tests. Several possible groupings have 
been considered. In summary, the TRE model’s inefficiency estimates do not show 
any statistically significant difference across hospital types. The estimates obtained 
from the pooled model are significant at 10% level only for two cases, suggesting 
respectively a higher efficiency in favor of subsidized versus non-subsidized hospitals 
and non-profit versus for-profit hospitals. Overall, the results do not provide any 
conclusive evidence of significant difference across ownership/subsidy types.  
Given that these tests are performed on the efficiency estimates, there is a 
possibility that estimation errors of the efficiency scores mask the differences across 
hospital types, resulting in under-rejection of the null hypothesis. Therefore, in a 
complementary analysis, we estimated a GLS random-effect model based on the 
specification given in Equation (4), with three additional dummies respectively for 
subsidized, for-profit and non-profit hospitals. The results of this regression are listed 
in the appendix (Table A.1). All three dummies proved to be insignificant, suggesting 
that after controlling for other factors, subsidization and ownership do not have any 
significant effect on hospital costs. This conclusion is consistent with the results 
reported in previous studies [1,2].  
It should be noted that the above results are based on the assumption that input 
prices especially capital prices are exogenous. One of the main differences across 
different ownership/subsidy types is related to their access to capital resulting in 
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relatively high capital prices for non-subsidized and for-profit hospitals. Our 
additional analyses indicate that if capital prices are not included in the model, the 
inefficiency estimates could be significantly higher in non-subsidized and for-profit 
hospitals.   
 
Table 5: Average inefficiency by ownership/subsidy type (pooled model) 
PUBLIC PRIVATE NON-PROFIT
PRIVATE
FOR-PROFIT TOTAL
SUBSIDIZED 0.1241 0.1212 0.1130 0.1225
NON SUBSIDIZED - 0.1559 0.1207 0.1417
TOTAL 0.1241 0.1268 0.1159 0.1242  
 
Table 6: Average inefficiency by ownership/subsidy type (TRE model) 
PUBLIC PRIVATE NON-PROFIT
PRIVATE
FOR-PROFIT TOTAL
SUBSIDIZED 0.0589 0.0607 0.0627 0.0597
NON SUBSIDIZED - 0.0623 0.0665 0.0640
TOTAL 0.0589 0.0610 0.0641 0.0601  
 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
A stochastic total cost frontier has been estimated for an unbalanced panel of 
150 Swiss general hospitals over the six-year period from 1998 and 2003, including 
632 observations. The adopted specification is based on the Cobb-Douglas functional 
form with the hospital output considered in two groups: inpatient cases adjusted by 
the average AP-DRG cost weights and ambulatory output measured by corresponding 
revenues. A number of output characteristics such as average length of stay and the 
number of ambulatory clinics as well as teaching characteristics are included in the 
model.  
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The regression results point to considerable unexploited scale economies in a 
majority of the studied hospitals. The results also confirm several findings reported in 
previous studies. Namely, the length of hospital stays has an important marginal cost 
suggesting that hospitals with long hospitalizations can achieve considerable savings 
by curtailing lengthy hospital stays. The marginal cost of ambulatory care is about 
less than a tenth of that of inpatient care. Moreover, costs also depend on the type of 
care provided. For instance, hospitals with emergency care have higher costs and 
those with a geriatrics department have lower costs than comparable facilities.  
The results also indicate that hospitals with a greater number of medical units 
are relatively more costly. This implies that hospitals with a wide range of 
specialization are more costly than those that specialize in fewer services. However, 
the cost differences resulting from specialization are limited to a few percentage 
points for a relatively large change in the number of services. Hospitals with more 
ambulatory clinics are significantly less costly than similar hospitals. The results 
suggest a considerable marginal cost for graduate medical training positions, which is 
more or less comparable to that of ambulatory output. As expected, the quality of 
medical units for teaching purposes has a positive effect on hospital costs.  
The observed trends in the data indicate that over the study period, the average 
AP-DRG cost weight of Swiss hospitals has consistently grown at a rate of about 1 
percentage point per year, suggesting that the patient case mix treated in hospitals has 
become more severe. The estimations suggest that after accounting for these changes 
in average severity, the total costs still show an increase of about 1.5 percent per year 
in a typical general hospital. Overall, we can conclude that over time, the Swiss 
general hospitals have increasingly treated more severe cases with disproportionately 
higher costs. This can be partly explained by technological progress, which enables 
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the hospitals to provide more complex thus more costly medical interventions. Such 
changes are only partially captured by variation of cost weights between different AP-
DRG categories. Another explanation could be because of the commonly observed 
growth in costs of labor-intensive services due to increasing wages and social benefits 
which is not fully captured by labor prices in two labor categories included in the 
model.  
The results suggest that the considerable excess costs of university hospitals, 
estimated in previous studies, can be explained by more extensive teaching activities 
in those hospitals as well as the relatively high quality of their medical units for 
teaching purposes. However, our analysis indicates that even after controlling for such 
differences university hospitals have shown a relatively poor cost-efficiency in the 
first two or three years of the sample period. The results also point to a statistically 
significant improvement of efficiency of university hospitals over the sample period 
such that the average efficiency difference with other hospitals has been negligible 
since 2001.  
Our analysis indicates that the inefficiency estimates could significantly 
change depending upon whether the unobserved hospital-specific heterogeneity is 
considered as inefficiency or as external factors beyond hospital’s control. A typical 
hospital’s average excessive costs due to productive inefficiencies are estimated about 
6 or 12 percent depending on the adopted assumption about hospital-specific 
persistent stochastic factors. While these factors are separated from inefficiency in the 
lower estimate (6 percent), the higher estimate (12 percent) does not exclude all these 
factors. Lacking any evidence in favor of either of these assumptions, we contend that 
the two estimates provide a reasonable lower and upper bounds for the average 
inefficiency score.  
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Finally, the effect of different regulatory systems on the hospital efficiency has 
been studied. The statistical tests do not provide any evidence of statistically 
significant efficiency differences across ownership and subsidization categories. This 
result has been confirmed by a panel data model that integrates the ownership/subsidy 
indicators. Lack of evidence for significant efficiency advantage of one type over 
another might be restricted to our data, thus should not be generalized. In fact, the 
potential correlation between hospital types and other cost driving factors might mask 
their actual ownership/subsidy effects. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Total cost function with a GLS model with random effects 
 
0.0144
(0.017)
-0.0067
(0.018)
0.0626
(0.041)
0.6313 * 0.6293 *
(0.017) (0.017)
0.4001 * 0.4020 *
(0.020) (0.020)
0.1043 * 0.1042 *
(0.0079) (0.0080)
0.1195 * 0.1203 *
(0.0090) (0.0092)
0.0342 * 0.0334 *
(0.013) (0.013)
0.1828 * 0.1831 *
(0.030) (0.030)
0.1515 * 0.1510 *
(0.020) (0.020)
0.0799 * 0.0825 *
(0.016) (0.016)
0.0948 * 0.0921 *
(0.037) (0.037)
0.0878 * 0.0858 *
(0.011) (0.011)
-0.3276 * -0.3351 *
(0.072) (0.072)
0.0687 * 0.0646 *
(0.030) (0.030)
0.0163 0.0136
(0.016) (0.016)
0.0472 0.0402
(0.026) (0.027)
-0.0300 * -0.0325 *
(0.013) (0.013)
-0.0111 -0.0106
(0.0086) (0.0086)
0.0142 0.0144
(0.0091) (0.0091)
0.0391 * 0.0396 *
(0.0087) (0.0087)
0.0601 * 0.0592 *
(0.0091) (0.0092)
0.0647 * 0.0639 *
(0.0097) (0.0097)
1.3167 * 1.2935 *
(0.22) (0.22)
Year 2003
Constant
 -
 -
Year 1999
Year 2000
Year 2001
Year 2002
Fraction of training 
positions A and B
Emergency Room
Nurse per bed
Number of 
medical units
Geriatrics
Number of 
non-medical units
Number of 
training positions
Fraction of 
ambulatory clinics
Fraction of medical units 
recognized by FMH
Outpatient revenues
P K (capital price)     
P L  - physicians     
P L  - others         
Private Non-Profit
Subsidized
Number of admissions 
(AP-DRG adjusted)
Average length of all 
hospitalizations
Model I Model II
Private For-Profit  -
 
 
* Significant at 5% or less.  
Standard errors are given in parentheses; Dependent variable is hospital's total costs;  
All variables except fractions and dummies are in logarithms. 
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